Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work by Befort, Stephen F
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2003 
Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical 
and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work 
Stephen F. Befort 
University of Minnesota Law School, befor001@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2003), available at 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/22. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
Revisiting the Black Hole of
Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent
Work
Stephen F. Befortt
I. IN TRO D UCTION .................................................................................... 154
II. 1950-PREDOMINANCE OF LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT ...................... 155
III. 2000-THE NEW CONTINGENT WORKFORCE ....................................... 158
IV. INCENTIVES FOR CONTINGENT WORK ARRANGEMENTS ..................... 160
A. Corporate Desire for Flexibility ................................................... 160
B. Worker D esire for Flexibility ....................................................... 161
C. Advances in Technology ............................................................... 161
D. Legal and Financial Considerations ............................................ 162
V. THE BLACK HOLE OF WORKPLACE REGULATION ............................... 164
A. Threshold Jurisdictional Requirements ........................................ 165
B. The Definition of Covered "Employment .................................. 166
C . The Labor Law Void ..................................................................... 169
VI. ENHANCING EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION FOR THE CONTINGENT
W O RK FO RCE ........................................................................................ 17 1
A. Expanding the Reach of Employment Protection Statutes ........... 172
B. Enhancing the Option of Collective Bargaining for Leased
E m p loy ees ..................................................................................... 174
C. Increasing the Portability of Benefits ........................................... 176
V II. C ON CLU SIO N ........................................................................................ 177
t Gray, Plant, Mooty Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
thanks Kimberly Fuhrman and Sarah Link Schultz for their excellent research assistance on this project
as well as Anne T. Johnson for editorial assistance.
154 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 24:1
I.
INTRODUCTION
A dramatic shift in the nature of work relationships in the United States
has occurred during the past two decades. Long-term employment
constituted the predominant model of structuring work relationships well
into the 1970s. Since then, American firms increasingly have resorted to a
variety of non-traditional work arrangements. These new workers,
frequently denominated the "contingent workforce," tend to have a weaker
workplace affiliation and a lower expectation of long-term employment.'
Some commentators laud contingent work arrangements as a means of
enhancing competitive flexibility in a global marketplace.2 Others decry
these arrangements as unstable or unfair.' The latter view often is
accompanied by proposals for reform, the most common of which is a call
for an expanded definition of employment subject to regulation.4
A fresh look at the contingent work phenomenon is appropriate in a
post-Enron world. The Enron scandal has taught us that corporate
manipulations designed to maximize wealth do not necessarily produce
socially desirable results. In some circumstances, our legal system needs to
provide minimum safeguards to protect economically dependent workers
from the machinations of more powerful entrepreneurs. Yet, a legislated
return to the workplace of 1950 is as unwise as it is impossible.
This article takes a fresh look at contingent work with the aid of two
perspectives. First, this article takes a historical perspective in analyzing
the forces that have spurred the adoption of new work arrangements. An
historical view provides a useful vantage point for understanding the
decline in long-term employment and the problems that have accompanied
this development. The creation of a veritable regulation-free zone in
portions of the contingent work landscape is the most significant of these
problems. Next, this article looks comparatively for possible solutions for
1. For a general discussion of the contingent workforce, see RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE
CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED
WORKFORCE (1989); Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt,
or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557 (1996); Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The
Growing Contingent Workforce: A Challenge for the Future, 10 LAB. LAW. 143 (1994).
2. See generally Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent
Employment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (1995).
3. See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and
Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879 (1995); Hiatt
& Rhinehart, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond Economic Realities: The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L.
REV. 239, 266 (1997) (urging the extension of federal anti-discrimination statutes to cover independent
contractors and their employees); Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and
Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 112-14 (1984) (urging the adoption of an "economic realities"
test for determining employee status).
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reining in this growing black hole in a rational, policy-driven manner.
Part I of this article begins by describing the internal labor markets that
predominated during the middle of the twentieth century. Part II
summarizes the variety of non-traditional work arrangements that comprise
contingent work today. Part III bridges this fifty-year span by identifying
the principal factors that have contributed to the decline in long-term
employment and the concomitant rise in contingent work arrangements.
Part IV moves from the historical to the analytical by discussing the key
social and economic shortcomings of the current legal regime. Finally, Part
V offers three proposals for legal reform, drawing heavily on comparative
legal systems that have attempted to grapple with the problems flowing
from the "flexibilisation"5 of work.
II.
1950-PREDOMINANCE OF LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT
The American workplace of 1950 was characterized by internal labor
markets and long-term employment.6 Rather than periodically bidding for
workers in external markets, employers looked within their organizations
for a dependable supply of labor.7 Employers hired raw talent, developed
employee skills, and then reaped the benefits of a loyal and productive
workforce.'
This was not always the case. Employment tenure during the late
1800s and early 1900s was very transitory in nature. Plant foremen ruled
the industrial scene, hiring and firing with impunity.9 Many firms during
this period experienced monthly separation rates in excess often per cent.10
The employment landscape began to change during the first half of the
twentieth century, as an unlikely alliance of trade unionists and personnel
managers advocated practices linked with long-term employment tenure. II
Unions provided the initial push.' 2 One of the unions' central objectives
5. See REINHOLD FAHLBECK, FLEXIBILISATION OF WORKING LIFE: POTENTIALS AND
CHALLENGES FOR LABOUR LAW, AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 12 (1998).
6. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 15-23 (1997); SANFORD M. JACOBY,
EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, 241-285 (1985).
7. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 15.
8. Id.
9. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 144-45 (1990); JACOBY, supra note 6, at 16-23.
10. See JACOBY, supra note 6, at 32. See also D. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA 1850-1920, 163 (1978) (noting that the majority of industrial workers in the period from 1905
to 1917 changed jobs at least once every three years).
11. See JACOBY, supra note 6, at 6-7.
12. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 17; WEILER, supra note 9, at 141, 151.
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was to substitute fair and standardized employment practices for the
arbitrary dictates of the foreman. 3 As unionization rates rose dramatically
during World War I and again following the onset of the Great
Depression, 14 so, too, did such bargained-for practices as seniority and job
security. 5
Proponents of scientific personnel management also favored the
rationalization of employment policies.'6 In part, these personnel managers
saw internal labor markets as a means to reduce the costs associated with
high employee turn-over. 7 Managers realized that a stable workforce
would reduce recruitment and training costs while simultaneously boosting
employee morale. 8
The personnel managers' principal impetus, however, was to avoid
unionization within their organizations. 9 By espousing fair treatment and
job security measures of their own, these "good" employers hoped to
undercut the felt need for union representation in their workforce.2" As
noted by Professor Sanford Jacoby, "the continuing irony in personnel
management was that it best served the purpose of thwarting unionism by
introducing the same reforms the unions sought."'"
The prevalent internal labor market model of 1950 was designed to
encourage career rather than casual employment tenure.2 Toward this end,
employers adopted personnel policies that included competitive wage rates,
training and development plans, and internal lines of progression and
promotion." The most important of these new policies, was managerial
commitment to long-term job security.24
By 1950, most American employers accepted the principle that
13. See JACOBY, supra note 6, at 23-30.
14. See Cox, BOK, GORMAN & FINKIN, LABOR LAW 39, 80 (13th ed. 1996) (reporting that trade
union membership nearly doubled in the period from 1914 to 1920 and then quadrupled from 1933 to
the early 1940s).
15. See JACOBY, supra note 6, at 241-50.
16. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 16.
17. See WEILER, supra note 9, at 146-47; Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work:
Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 733, 741 (1986).
18. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 21-23; WEILER, supra note 9, at 146-49.
19. See WEILER, supra note 9, at 151; JACOBY, supra note 6, at 250-55; Finkin, supra note 17, at
741-42.
20. See JACOBY, supra note 6, at 254-55, 282-83.
21. Id. at 255.
22. See id. at 245-74 (describing the rise of internal labor markets and increased employee job
security); See also WEILER, supra note 9, at 146 (noting the transition of the employment relationship
from casual to career in nature).
23. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 17-21; JACOBY, supra note 6, at 262-67; Finkin, supra note 17,
at 741-42.
24. CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 19-21; JACOBY, supra note 6, at 254-55, 267-69; Katherine V. W.
Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 523, 535 (2001).
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employees should be discharged only for just cause. In the unionized
sector, which composed 31.5 percent of the non-agricultural workforce in
1950,26 the terms of collective bargaining agreements generally compelled a
just cause standard. 27 In the non-union sector, employers generally adhered
to this practice through an implicit understanding with their employees.2 8
Thus, the rise of internal labor markets reduced employee turnover
rates' 9 and fostered the development of an extra-legal social contract in
which employers and employees possessed legitimate expectations of a
long-term relationship.3" A key ingredient of this social contract was the
understanding that employees could expect continued employment so long
as they adequately performed their job duties.3 In short, employees at the
mid-century mark could say, with William Whyte's The Organization Man,
that "his relationship is to be for keeps. 32
Richard S. Belous described this employment model as that of a "core
worker system."33 He explained that:
Core workers have a strong affiliation with an employer and are treated by
the employer as having a significant stake in the company. Core workers
can be thought of as having as being part of the so-called corporate family.
They show long-term attachment to a company and have a real measure of
job stability.34
Internal labor markets and the core worker system dominated American
work relationships well into the 1970s."5
25. See JACOBY, supra note 6, at 269.
26. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 1980b 412, tbl.165, as reprinted in
MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10, tbl.l (1987);
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970,
Bicentennial Edition, Series D 927-939 (1975) (illustrating that approximately fifteen million American
workers in 1950 belonged to unions).
27. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of 'Just Cause' in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594 n. I (citing a 1983 Bureau of National Affairs report that
stated that 94% of collective bargaining agreements entered into under the NLRA contain clauses that
provide that an employer may discharge employees only with 'just cause").
28. See Stone, supra note 24, at 523 (stating that "[t]he internal labor market involved employers
giving their workers an implicit promise of long-term employment").
29. See JACOBY, supra note 6, at 276.
30. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 200-01(describing "an implicit employment contract" by which
"[l]oyalty and retention by the employee are rewarded by stable employment and income"); See also
JACOBY, supra note 6, at 269 (noting the "widespread acceptance of the principle that a worker could be
dismissed only for just cause").
31. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 80 (1993); Thomas A. Kochan,
Reconstructing America's Social Contract in Employment: The Role of Policy, Institutions, and
Practices, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 137, 138 (1999); Stone, supra note 24, at 523.
32. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN 75 (1957).
33. BELOUS, supra note 1, at 12.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. at 12.
2003
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IlI.
2000-THE NEW CONTINGENT WORKFORCE
Today, a large and growing group of workers provide labor or services
based on a variety of arrangements that deviate from the traditional core
worker model. The "contingent workforce" is a catch-phrase that
encompasses a diverse group of non-core workers who provide work other
than on a long-term, full-time basis. 6 While no universally-accepted
definition of contingent work exists,37 it is clear that this amorphous group
is steadily increasing in size. 8
It is helpful to think of contingent workers in two broad categories.3
One group, consisting of independent contractors, contracted workers, and
leased employees, are not legally classified as employees of the entity for
whom they provide services." Independent contractors are self-employed
workers who are engaged by a company to "provide specialized services on
a contract basis."'" Contracted, or out-sourced, work occurs when a
company uses another firm to perform a particular service, such as janitorial
services or copy services.4 2 Finally, leased employees are workers who are
employed by one entity, typically an employee leasing firm, but who
provide work for a separate user entity.43
The second group of workers, consisting of part-time and temporary
employees, have the legal status of employees but with a lessened degree of
attachment to the workplace as compared to traditional "core" employees.
Part-time employees are those who are scheduled for less than the usual
forty-hour work week.44 Temporary employees perform work at a particular
company as a short-term supplement to a firm's regular workforce.45
In addition to the difficulty of determining who is a contingent worker,
or perhaps because of that difficulty, it is almost impossible to ascertain the
exact number of contingent workers in the U.S. economy. Reliable
36. See id. at 6.
37. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 78-79 (1998)
(capturing the confusion surrounding the scope of the contingent workforce by titling a section of her
article, "The Elusive Concept of 'Contingent' Employment").
38. See Daniel J. Roy, Contingent Workers: Contingent Workers Cut Labor Costs While
Increasing Worker Insecurity, DAILY LAB. REP., October 26, 1995, at C-I.
39. See generally Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9
STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 53, 57 (1998).
40. See infra notes 104-116 and accompanying text (discussing the legal tests for determining
"employee" status).
41. Mark Diana & Robin H. Rome, Beyond Traditional Employment: The Contingent Workforce,
196 N.J. LAW 8, 9 (1999).
42. See Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 1, at 146.
43. See id; BELOUS, supra note 1, at 46.
44. See, e.g., Diana & Rome, supra note 41, at 8, 9.
45. Id. at 9.
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estimates, however, range upwards to 20 to 30 percent of all American
workers,46 accounting for more than thirty million members of the
American workforce.47 The proportion of contingent workers, moreover, is
undoubtedly growing. One commentator asserts that the contingent
workforce has grown approximately 75 percent faster than the overall
workforce between 1980 and 1993.48 More recently, as the United States
struggles to climb out of a recession, a majority of the new jobs are of the
contingent variety.49
While a diverse group in some respects, contingent workers share
several common characteristics. First, contingent workers tend to have a
weak affiliation with their workplace.5" In contrast to "core" employees,
these workers typically are not considered a part of the corporate family and
have lower expectations of long-term employment with a single entity.5
Second, although not a universal characteristic, contingent workers often
receive reduced pay and benefits compared to traditional employees.52 The
benefit shortfall is particularly notable with respect to health care
insurance.53 Finally, many contingent workers have not voluntarily chosen
their work status.54 Some studies indicate that as many as 60 percent of
46. See BELOUS, supra note 1, at 15-17 (estimating that approximately 25 to 30 percent of U.S.
workers fall into contingent categories); STANLEY NOLLEN & HELEN AXEL, MANAGING CONTINGENT
WORKERS 9-10 (1996) (estimating that approximately 20 to 25 percent of U.S. workers fall into
contingent categories); Middleton, supra note 1, at 564 (estimating that about one-quarter of the nation's
working population are contingent workers). But see Dietrich et al., supra note 39, at 58 (using more
stringent criteria to estimate that contingent workers comprise about ten percent of the U.S. workforce).
47. See BELOUS, supra note 1, at 16 tbl.2.1 (calculating between 29.9 and 36.6 million contingent
American workers as of 1988); Middleton, supra note 1, at 564 (estimating the number of contingent
workers in 1996 at approximately 32 to 37 million). The two largest categories of contingent workers
are part-time workers and independent contractors. See BELOUS, supra note 1, at 16 tbl.2.1 (estimating
19.8 million part-time workers and 10.1 million independent contractors).
48. See Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The Key Challenges and
Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 867 (1995); see also Middleton, supra note 1, at 564
(noting a greater than 30 percent increase in contingent workers between 1980 and 1996).
49. See Margaret Webb Pressler, Rising Use of Temps is Making an Impact, STAR TRIBUNE, July
1, 2002, at D3 (reporting that 25,000 of the 41,000 new jobs added to the American economy during
May 2002 were temporary in nature).
50. See BELOUS, supra note 1, at 5-6.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 1, at 148-49; Middleton, supra note 1, at 564-65
(noting that part-time employees earned 58 percent of the hourly wage of median full-time employees
in 1989); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 571 n.1 1 (1997) (noting that the average hourly wage for temporary employees
in 1994 was 35 percent lower than it was for full-time employees).
53. See Middleton, supra note 1, at 565 (noting that only 22 percent of part-time workers received
health care benefits through their employers in 1988 as compared to 78 percent of full-time employees);
Karst, supra note 52, at 571 n.13 ("Since 1990, the nation's mostly female temp force has mushroomed
more than 85 percent. Yet only 8 percent of temps receive health benefits ... ").
54. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 35 (1994) [hereinafter REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
2003
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temporary employees55 and 25 percent of part-time employees5 6 would
prefer more traditional full-time jobs. As such, this subset of contingent
workers essentially is underemployed. 7
IV.
INCENTIVES FOR CONTINGENT WORK ARRANGEMENTS
What has caused this historical shift? A brief review of the principal
factors that have spurred this change provides a unique perspective for
analyzing the contingent work phenomenon. 8 This Part discusses four key
catalysts in the contingency explosion.
A. Corporate Desire for Flexibility
Many firms see contingent work arrangements as a means to maximize
labor market flexibility. Advances in technology and transportation have
created a global economy in which American firms must compete on an
international basis. 9  In this increasingly global economy, companies
experience "severe fluctuations in their need for labor."60 Employers use
contingent workers as one method of coping with this reality. Contingent
workers add labor market flexibility by enabling companies to adjust
personnel and staffing needs while avoiding "the expense of cyclical hiring
and lay-off periods."'" A growing body of contingent workers acts as a
flexible cushion supplementing core workers in the labor market. Firms
RELATIONS] (stating that "a large percentage of workers who hold part-time or temporary positions do
so involuntarily."); Lester, supra note 37, at 86-87; Ame L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and Workers in
the United States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 771, 772 (1995).
55. See Pressler, supra note 49, at D3 (referring to a 1999 study).
56. See Kalleberg, supra note 54, at 772.
57. See Lester, supra note 37, at 86-87 (stating the view that contingent work is
"underemployment"-meaning that there is a growing class "of workers for whom there is a 'mismatch'
between the jobs they hold, and their human capital, abilities, and desires."). See id. at 86.
58. For a broader discussion of the historical changes in the law and practices of the workplace
that occurred between 1950 and 2000, see Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the
Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 BOS. COL. L. REV. 351 (2002).
59. See CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 42-47 (1993) (describing the rise of the global
economy); HUDSON INSTITUTE, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 1-5 (1987) (hereinafter "WORKFORCE 2000") (depicting the development of an integrated
world economy since the 1960's). See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND SOCIAL POLICY 77 (1973) (detailing the reality that, given the lower wage structures of most
developing nations, American employers now face intense resistance in virtually every sector in which
international production is feasible). See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of
Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 13 n.33 (1993) (noting that "[t]he impact of
international product market competition has been principally felt in the manufacturing sector-in
particular, the clothing, steel, automobile, rubber, and electronics industries").
60. NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 46, at 22.
61. Hylton, supra note 2, at 858.
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expand their workforce by hiring contingent workers in boom times, and
then let the contingent workers go during downturns.62 Similarly, the
pressure to "restructure" or "downsize" corporations in recent years has led
employers to adjust their workforce in favor of more contingent
employees.63 In short, contingent work arrangements facilitate a flexible
labor market and provide significant cost savings for American firms.'
B. Worker Desire for Flexibility
Many workers also find contingent work arrangements desirable,
particularly those seeking to balance work and family responsibilities.65
The proportion of women who participate in the American workforce has
nearly doubled during the past fifty years. 66 Whether as a single-family
wage-earner or part of a married, dual-earner family,67 the movement of
society's traditional care-givers into the workplace puts considerable strain
on family child care and elder care needs. 68  Not surprisingly, many male
and female workers gravitate toward flexible work arrangements, such as
part-time work and contracted work at home, as a means to accommodate
the needs of work and family.69
C. Advances in Technology
Technological advances also have spurred contingent work
arrangements.7" Sophisticated computer and telecommunications systems
62. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & STEWART SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW 25 (2000).
63. See NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 46, at 20.
64. See BELOUS, supra note 1, at 8.
65. See NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 46, at 23 (stating that as "more people... move in and out of
the labor force, [there are more] who prefer part-time or temporary jobs because of competing demands
on their time, [who are in] different states in the life cycle, or [who have] different family
circumstances.").
66. In 1950, 33.9% of adult women were members of the labor force. See HANDBOOK OF U.S.
LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, PRICES, PRODUCTIVITY, AND OTHER LABOR DATA 52,
tbl.l-7 (Eva E. Jacobs ed. 3d ed. 1999). By 2000, 61.1 percent of all adult women, or almost double the
earlier figure, were gainfully employed outside the home. See WORKFORCE 2000, supra note 59, at 85,
tbl.3-4.
67. See LUCIA ALBINO GILBERT, TWO CAREERS/ONE FAMILY 5 (1993) (stating that "current
norms assume not only that single and married men will work but also that single and married women
will work"); 19 HUMAN RESOURCES REP. 1100 (BNA)(Oct 15, 2001) (reporting that only 19.2 percent
of American married-couple families in 2000 followed the traditional model in which the husband is in
the labor force while the wife is at home).
68. See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 35 (noting
that flexibility in work arrangements "helps some workers, more of whom must balance the demands of
family and work as the numbers of dual-earner and single-parent households rise.").
69. See generally Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
25, 33-36 (1998) (discussing desires of both women and men to balance work and family).
70. See Lester, supra note 37, at 112 (noting the acceptance of many that, among other things,
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permit work to be removed from a physical worksite or a traditional nine-
to-five work schedule.7 Fax machines, e-mail, and the internet enable a
growing number of contingent workers to provide services from their
homes or other non-traditional sites.72 This, in turn, permits firms to reduce
costs by reducing the size of their facilities and paying only for work
actually needed.73  In addition, many companies now support their
technological systems with an outside consultant, most likely an
independent contractor or a contracted worker, rather than an in-house
employee.74 In these and other ways, technology is changing not only how
work is done, but also the nature of the worker performing the task.
D. Legal and Financial Considerations
Finally, American business entities have powerful legal and financial
incentives to increase their use of contingent workers. This is particularly
true for those contingent workers who fall outside of the legal definition of
an "employee."
Most statutes governing the workplace only apply within the context of
the employment relationship. For example, while an employer must
comply with the legal mandates of such statutes as Title VII,75 the Fair
Labor Standards Act,76 and ERISA77 or face the prospect of substantial
technological change as contributed to the "drive toward contingent staffing"); Brian A. Langille & Guy
Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB L. &
POL. J. 7, 8 (1999) (noting that "revolutionary developments in information technologies... have
conspired to create new modes of laboring").
71. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 78 (4th ed.1998); U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING
REPORT, 6 (1994) [hereinafter FACT FINDING REPORT]; see generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE
INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (1996) (describing the impact of changes in
information technology on social and economic trends).
72. See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 71, at 78-80.
73. See id. at 78.
74. See Renate M. De Haas, Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 483 (1998)
(stating that in Silicon Valley "many of [the] high technology contingent employees are independent
contractors...").
75. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2002), bans
discrimination with respect to hiring, discharge, compensation and other terms and conditions of
employment.
76. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § § 201-19 (2002) (mandating that
employers pay covered employees a minimum hourly wage, currently pegged at $5.15 per hour, and
compensate work performed in excess of 40 hours in a week at one and one-half times the employee's
regular rate of pay; the FLSA contains numerous exemptions, the most significant being for executive,
administrative, and professional employees). See id. § 213(a)(1) (2002).
77. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § § 1001-1461 (2002),
regulates pension and employee welfare benefit plans. It establishes procedural requirements with
respect to the reporting, disclosure and fiduciary responsibilities for such plans. See 29 U.S.C. § § 1021-
1031 (2002). While ERISA contains detailed provisions governing the funding and content of pension
plans, it contains little substantive regulation concerning the content of welfare benefit plans, such as
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monetary liability, these statutes are inapplicable to non-employee workers
such as independent contractors, contracted workers, and leased workers.78
Similarly, workers who are not employed by the entity for whom they
provide labor are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)79 and have no legal protection in seeking to unionize.8" Since the
factors for determining whether a worker is an "employee" are prone to
manipulation,8 many firms consciously structure woxk relationships in a
manner that will avoid "employee" status and its accompanying legal
strictures.82
Firms also can save costs through the use of contingent workers.
Business entities are responsible for payroll taxes and contributions to
unemployment insurance and workers compensation plans only for their
"employees."83  Firms avoid these expenses by replacing traditional
employees with non-employee contingent workers. Moreover, as noted
above, firms tend to provide contingent workers with lower pay and
benefits.84 Many companies view core employee status as a convenient and
defensible eligibility threshold for conferring premium pay and benefits.85
those providing health benefits. Instead, the principal impact of ERISA on employment law matters is
the act's broad preemptive exclusion of state regulation. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2002) ("[T]he
provisions of [ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter
relate to any employee benefit plan."). See generally Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The
Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2000).
78. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing that the coverage of these and other
statutes extend only to individuals who fall within the legal definition of an "employee").
79. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 151-69 (2002), protects the right of
employees to seek union representation, to bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of mutual aid and protection.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2002) (defining an "employee" for purposes of the NLRA). The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the administrative agency charged with enforcing the NLRA,
uses the common law test in determining employee status. See Roadway Package System, 326 N.L.R.B.
842 (1998). See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (describing the common law test).
81. See Middleton, supra note 1, at 568-69 (stating that "the legal test for determining
employee/independent contractor status is a complex and manipulable multifactor test which invites
employers to structure their relationships with employees in whatever manner best evades liability.");
see also infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text (discussing the legal tests for determining
"employee" status).
82. See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 35 (1994)
(stating that "current tax, labor, and employment law gives employers and employees incentives to
create contingent relationships not for the sake of flexibility or efficiency but in order to evade their
legal obligations."); Middleton, supra note 1, at 571 (noting that employers are motivated to categorize
workers as non-employees in order to avoid legal regulations applicable to employees).
83. See generally REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 54, at
40-41.
84. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 899 (1998) (reviewing legality of pension and welfare plan benefits made available to
common law employees but not to similarly situated workers designated as independent contractors).
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V.
THE BLACK HOLE OF WORKPLACE REGULATION
The surge in contingent work has brought several problems.
Contingent workers tend to earn less pay than their core employee
counterparts.8 6 They are less likely to enjoy employer-paid health care
coverage and other employee benefits.87 Contingent workers generally
receive less trairing and experience more frequent periods of
unemployment.88  Not surprisingly, contingent workers are
disproportionately female and African-American.89
The increase in contingent work arrangements, coupled with plant
relocations and downsized operations,9" also has contributed to a decline in
long-term employment. As at the beginning of the twentieth century,91 the
employment relationship of the twenty-first century has become more
transitory.92 This time, however, the cause is capital mobility rather than
labor mobility.93 Many Americans perceive this change in employment
practices as an unfair breach of the earlier social contract 94 and an
abandonment of internal labor markets driven by greed, as opposed to just
efficiency. 95 And, the response of many members of the contemporary
workforce is to feel less loyalty and commitment to their employers.96
86. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
88. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 881-82. See also CAPELLI, supra note 6, at 141-42 ("As
more part-time and subcontracted employees are taken on board, companies are unwilling to underwrite
both remedial and technical skills training, on the presumably accurate perception that such workers will
not remain with the company long enough to pay back their investments.").
89. Patricia Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contingent Work Force Demand a Change in
Federal Policy? 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 731, 732 (1995) (noting that "the percentage of African
Americans in the temporary work force is double that of the whole work force" and that "two out of
every three temporary workers are women").
90. See, e.g., CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 27-29, 44-63; THOMAS KOCHAN, ET AL., THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 114-15 (1986).
91. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
92. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 177-79 (discussing various studies showing a decline in job
tenure during the 1980's and 1990's).
93. Advances in trade and technology have made capital increasingly mobile. See generally
ROBERT G. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 113-22, 263-64 (1991) (describing the significant mobility
of capital in the new global economy). Modem advances in information and communication
technologies, in particular, have enabled employers to produce goods wherever labor costs are the most
attractive. See R. Blanpain, The Changing World of Work, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 23, 24-26 (R. Blanpain & Chris
Engels, eds. 6th ed., 1998) (describing the impact of technology on the global movement of goods and
services). American employers, accordingly, have shifted production to the Sunbelt and developing
nations as a means of escaping unions and lowering labor costs. See KOCHAN, supra note 90, at 66-68.
94. See CAPPELLI, supra note 6, at 200-201; Sanford M. Jacoby, Melting into Air? Downsizing,
Job Stability, and the Future of Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195, 1220-21(2000).
95. See Jacoby, supra note 94, at 1221.
96. Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J.503, 520
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While these social and economic issues are very important, the most
significant legal problem posed by the rise in nonstandard employment
arrangements is that many of these workers fall outside of the regulatory
safety net constructed for the employment relationship. This regulatory
"black hole" occurs primarily for three reasons.
A. Threshold Jurisdictional Requirements
Employment statutes, utilizing various formulations, exempt certain
types of workers and employers from the scope of coverage. Contingent
workers frequently fall outside the zone of statutory regulation because of
these threshold requirements.
For example, some employment statutes only apply to employees who
have attained a certain level of workplace attachment with a particular
employer. The FMLA, for example, guarantees leave time only to
employees who have worked for the same employer for at least one year
and for at least 1,250 hours during the previous twelve-month period.97
Under ERISA, employers may establish a minimum five-year employment
period before an employee's pension fully vests.98 In addition, ERISA does
not compel an employer to allow participation in a pension plan until an
employee works at least 1,000 hours in a twelve-month period.99 Similarly,
most state statutes require an employee to work twenty weeks per year in
order to qualify for unemployment insurance benefits.' Part-time and
temporary employees often fail to meet these threshold jurisdictional
requirements.
In a related vein, several statutes only apply to employers having a
minimum number of employees. The FMLA, for example, does not apply
to employers with fewer than 50 employees.0 1 Title VII1 2 and the ADA °3
each require a minimum of fifteen employees for coverage to occur. Some
employers can avoid the applicability of such laws by utilizing independent
contractors and temporary workers to stay under the respective numerical
thresholds.
(1997) (noting that contingent workers generally have a "reduced sense of attachment and loyalty to the
enterprise"); BELOUS, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that "contingent workers have a weak affiliation with a
specific employer and do not have a significant stake in a company").
97. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(2002).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(2002).
99. 29 U.S.C. § § 1052(a)(1), 1052(a)(3)(A)(2002).
100. See Virginia L. duRivage, New Policies for the Part-time and Contingent Workforce, in NEW
POLICIES FOR PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKERS 106 (Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2002).
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B. The Definition of Covered "Employment"
Most significantly, American labor and employment regulations
invariably extend only to "employees."' 4  Given the restrictive tests
currently used to determine employee status, many contingent workers fall
outside of the zone of statutory coverage.
American courts have used a variety of tests to determine whether a
worker is an "employee" and thus entitled to the benefits of protective labor
and employment legislation. The most restrictive of these tests is the
common law agency test.'I 5 This test primarily focuses on the employer's
"right to control" not only the "result accomplished by the work," but also
"the details and means by which that result is accomplished."'0 6 If such a
right to control is found to exist, then the worker is deemed to be an
employee.' 7 In the absence of such a right to control, the worker is
classified as an independent contractor and exempt from the coverage of
labor and employment regulation.
A more inclusive "economic realities" test is used to determine
employee status under the FLSA. °8 As a 1968 Department of Labor
opinion letter summarized, "an employee, as distinguished from a person
who is engaged as a business of his own, is one who, as a matter of
economic reality follows the usual path of an employee and is dependent on
the business for which he serves."'0 9 While an employer's right to control
the manner in which work is performed is still an important factor under
this approach, the economic realities standard assesses these and other
factors by asking "whether the putative employee is economically
dependent upon the principal or instead is in business for himself."' "0
104. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 882 (stating that "under our social welfare system, the
receipt of statutory protection or benefits is dependent on a person meeting the definition of employee
under the relevant statute"); REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra
note 54, at 37 (noting that the "single most important factor in determining which workers are covered
by employment and labor statutes is the way the line is drawn between employees and independent
contractors").
105. The multi-factor formula of the common law test is set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
106. Maltby & Yamada, supra note 4, at 248.
107. See id.
108. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947); Donovan v. Dialamerica Mktg.,
Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985). The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 2601-54, adopts
the FLSA's definition of a covered "employee," and similarly utilizes an economic realities test for
determining the existence of an employment relationship. See 29 C.F.R. 825.105. The economic
realities test was first developed under the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. Ill (1947). That decision was overturned by the Taft-Hartley amendments
adopted by Congress later that same year, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the NLRB now uses the common law
test for ascertaining employee status. See Roadway Package System, 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998).
109. W & H Opinion Letter No. 832, (June 25, 1968).
110. Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992).
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During the 1970s and 1980s, most federal courts of appeal adopted a
"hybrid" test for determining employee status under federal discrimination
statutes. This test combines elements of the common law and economic
realities tests."' Under the hybrid approach, courts examine the economic
realities of the work relationship, but with particular emphasis on "the
employer's right to control the 'means and manner' of the worker's
performance."112
Despite the growing popularity of the hybrid test, the Supreme Court
reinvigorated the common law standard in its 1992 decision in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden."3  At issue in that case was the
appropriate test for employee status under ERISA. The Court rejected the
use of an economic realities test under ERISA, suggesting that this broader
standard was limited in application to the unique statutory formulation of
the FLSA." 4 The Court instead adopted a thirteen-factor formulation of the
common law test." 5 The Darden decision has led many courts to replace
the hybrid test with the common law test in ascertaining employee status
under other statutes. 1
6
The restrictive Darden test is problematic for several reasons. For one
thing, the test sets an unpredictable standard. Any formula with thirteen
variables is bound to have considerable play in the joints. And, as the
Microsoft Corporation learned, mistaken assumptions about employee
status can entail costly consequences.117
111. See Deanne M. Mosely & William C. Walter, The Significance of the Classification of
Employment Relationships in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 Miss. L.J. 613, 636-637 (1998).
See also Maltby & Yamada, supra note 4, at 250 (stating "the hybrid test.., became the favored
standard for claims under both Title VII and the ADEA").
112. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983 ) (applying hybrid test to ADEA
claim).
113. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
114. Id. at 325-326
115. In Darden, the Court articulated thirteen factors that should be considered when determining
whether a worker is an employee or not: (1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished; (2) the skill required; (3) the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; (4) the location of the work; (5) the duration of the relationship between the parties; (6) whether
the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hiring
party's discretion over when and how long to work; (8) the method of payment; (9) the worker's role in
hiring and paying assistants; (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
(11) whether the hiring party.is in business; (12) the provisions of employee benefits; and (13) the tax
treatment of the hired party. Id. at 323-24.
116. See Maltby & Yamada, supra note 4, at 253. See also Lambertsen v. Utah Dep't of
Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996) (favoring common law test for Title VII claim, but
finding that because the common law and hybrid tests are so similar, the lower court did not commit
reversible error by applying the latter standard); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993)
(adopting the common law test for ADEA claim).
117. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1098 (1998) (holding that a group of workers erroneously classified by Microsoft as independent
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The Darden test also is prone to entrepreneurial manipulation. As the
final report of President Clinton's blue-ribbon Dunlop Commission noted,
the common law test provides employers with "a means and incentive to
circumvent the employment policies of the nation.""'  The incentive, of
course, is to avoid the costs and loss of flexibility associated with
governmental regulation." 9 The means is to structure work arrangements
so that subcontractors and leased employees fall on the non-employee side
of the Darden divide.120
Finally, the restrictive common law test is inconsistent with the
fundamental objectives of modem labor and employment legislation. This
legislation is rooted in the premise that "individual workers lack the
bargaining power in the labor market necessary to protect their own
interests and to obtain socially acceptable terms of employment." '121 The
common law test, which was fashioned in the nineteenth century for the
purpose of determining the reach of respondeat superior tort liability,' is
blind to this goal. By focusing solely on the right to control, the test denies
the benefits of protective social legislation to many workers who labor
under subordinate economic circumstances. As Professor Marc Linder puts
it, the common law test is rooted in "a denial of socioeconomic purpose."'23
The Title VII sex discrimination claim of Patricia Knight provides an
example of the Darden test's unresponsiveness to the objectives of labor
and employment legislation.'24 Ms. Knight worked as an insurance agent
contractors may be eligible as employees to participate in the company's pension plans).
118. REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 38.
119. Id. at 35 ("[Clurrent tax, labor, and employment law gives employers and employees
incentives to create contingent relationships not for the sake of flexibility or efficiency but in order to
evade their legal obligations."); Middleton, supra note 1, at 571 (noting that employers are motivated to
categorize workers as non-employees in order to avoid legal regulations applicable to employees).
120. Middleton, supra note 1, at 578 (explaining that businesses "enter complex arrangements of
subcontracting and employee leasing in order to circumvent their responsibilities toward the workers
involved"); Summers, supra note 96, at 518 (stating that "[e]mployers and their lawyers use all their
ingenuity to create forms of detached employment which will free users of all employee responsibility);
Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous
Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187, 227
(1999) (stating that the common law test "enables employers and judges to manipulate the appearances
of control").
121. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 7, 7 (1988). See also Taco van Peijpe, Independent Contractors and Protected Workers in Dutch
Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 127, 155 (1999) (stating that the fundamental rationale of protective
labor law is "to compensate for the social inequality constituted by economic dependency in labor
relations.").
122. See MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 133-70 (1989).
123. Linder, supra note 120, at 187. See also REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 37 (noting that the test for defining employee status "is based on a
nineteenth century concept whose purposes are wholly unrelated to contemporary employment policy").
124. Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1991).
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selling Farm Bureau Insurance Company policies. Farm Bureau trained
Ms. Knight in the art of insurance sales, assigned her to a designated sales
territory, and provided her with an office, a secretary, and a computer.
Farm Bureau required her to be present in the office during three specified
periods each week and to retrieve mail and messages on a daily basis. Farm
Bureau gave Ms. Knight written performance standards, which were backed
up by periodic evaluations. Ms. Knight's contract with Farm Bureau
prohibited her from selling the insurance products of any other company.125
The district court, after a two-day trial, found substantial evidence of sexual
harassment.' 26 Nonetheless, the court dismissed Ms. Knight's claim
because Farm Bureau did not control the intricacies of "the manner and
means by which she sold insurance." '127 Deterring the sexual harassment of
a subordinate and dependent worker such as Ms. Knight is apparently
beyond the common law test's purposes.
C. The Labor Law Void
Union density has declined precipitously in the United States during
the past few decades. In 1950, union members comprised 31.5 percent of
the non-agricultural labor force.'28 This percentage rose to 34.7 percent in
1954129 and then began to fall. Union density dropped to 24.7 percent in
197013" and continued downward to 16.1 percent in 1990.' The decline
has slowed, but not stopped, as data for 2001 shows union membership at
approximately 13.5 percent of the non-agricultural labor force.1
32
Contingent work arrangements contribute to the decline in union
membership in several ways. First, as noted above, many contingent
workers are not employees or, at least, not employees of the entity for
whom they provide work. 133 As such, these workers are not covered by the
NLRA and are not protected against discharge or other retaliatory acts if
they seek to join a union. 34 Second, part-time and temporary workers, even
125. Id. at 378.
126. Id. at 378.
127. Id.at381.
128. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 1980b 412, table 165, as reprinted
in GOLDFIELD, supra note 26, at 10, Table 1.
129. See id.
130. See Goldfield, supra note 26, at 11, table 2.
131. See Union Membership Stays on Downward Trend, Falling to 16.1 Percent of Employment,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) 26 (February 7, 1991) at B-8.
132. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Union Members Summary
(2001), available at http://bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited December 18, 2002). The
Bureau of Labor Statistics reports a total of 16.3 million union members in the United States in 2001.
See id
133. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)(2002) (defining an "employee" for purposes of the NLRA). The Board
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though legally classified as employees, commonly are excluded from
bargaining units on the grounds that they do not share a sufficient
community of interests with more permanent employees.'35 Thus, they are
not within the represented group even if a union successfully obtains
exclusive representative status. 1
36
Third, until recently, leased workers who work alongside regular
employees could not be included in a bargaining unit with the user firm's
employees without the consent of both joint employers.'37 Since one or
both of the employers invariably withhold consent, 138 these workers could
unionize only in a separate unit consisting solely of employees of the lessor
firm.139
Contingent workers, with their weak affiliation with the enterprise, are
a difficult group to organize. 14 ° Many contingent workers do not see the
benefits of union representation in an environment of short-term
employment. Employers are well aware that contingent work and unions
do not typically go hand-in-hand, and some employers hire contingent
workers as an affirmative tool of union avoidance. ' 4'
The point is not that unionization is inherently desirable or that
employer attempts to avoid the costs of dealing with unions'42 are inherently
undesirable. The point, rather, is that workers should have the right to
uses the common law test in determining employee status. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying
text (describing the common law test).
135. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1481-84 (Charles J. Morris, 2d ed. 1983); Summers, supra
note 96, at 513.
136. See generally duRivage, supra note 100, at 116 (reporting that part-time workers are only
approximately one-third as likely to be unionized as are full-time workers).
137. See Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947 (1990). The Board overruled Lee Hospital in 2000. See
M. B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000). Under the new standard announced in Sturgis, the
Board will include leased employees in a unit alongside regular employees without requiring consent so
long as the two groups share a sufficient community of interest so as to constitute a single appropriate
bargaining unit. Id. at 1304-05. Whether Sturgis will survive appellate review and/or reconsideration
by a new Bush labor board remains to be seen.
138. See Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board's Treatment of Temporary
Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1124 (2000).
139. See id. at 1113-15; see also Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1308 (reaffirming that the dispersed
employees of a supplier firm may seek to bargain with the supplier firm without needing to obtain the
consent of the various user firms).
140. See KOCHAN, supra note 90, at 221; Katherine M. Forster, Strategic Reform of Contingent
Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 551 (2001); Middleton, supra note 1, at 589-90.
141. See Forster, supra note 140, at 551; Linder, supra note 120, at 197-204.
142. The unionization of an employer's workforce tends to come with a sizeable wage premium.
See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS Do? 46, 64 (1984) (describing a 20
to 30 percent union wage and fringe benefit effect); H. G LEWIS, UNION RELATIVE WAGE EFFECTS: A
SURVEY 9 (1986) (describing a mean union/non-union wage gap of 15 percent for the period 1967-
1979). Accordingly, it is not surprising that union avoidance and resistance to union wage demands
have become a prime business strategy for many American employers. See KOCHAN, supra note 90, at
70, 107-108 (describing the financial incentive for American business to avoid unions).
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choose for themselves whether or not to be represented by a union. One of
the NLRA's key objectives is to protect "the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and the designation of
representatives of their own choosing." ' Managerial manipulation of
worker status to avoid unionization runs counter to this goal and
exacerbates the undesirable effects of the deregulation that has
accompanied the rise in contingent work arrangements.
VI.
ENHANCING EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION FOR
THE CONTINGENT WORKFORCE
The question remains as to the appropriate way to address this black
hole of deregulation. Should the hole be tolerated, filled, or reconfigured?
Our historical perspective on the growth of contingent work offers at least
two insights regarding a possible solution.
First, it is clear that powerful forces have contributed to the rise in
contingent work, including global economic competition, altered family-
work arrangements, and technological advances.'" The resulting
"flexibilisation" in work relationships is a world-wide phenomenon'45 that
is not likely to wane in the foreseeable future. Given these trends, it would
be impractical to prohibit contingent work arrangements or regulate such
practices to the point of inflexibility.
Second, the growth of non-standard work arrangements has skewed the
traditional line delimiting the reach of protective social legislation
pertaining to economically dependent workers. Traditionally, these
protections extended to employees who were considered dependent upon a
particular employer, but not to independent contractors, who were thought
of as autonomous entrepreneurs who did not need regulatory intervention. 1
46
Today, however, many contract and leased workers work side-by-side with
more traditional employees and, regardless of nomenclature, share an
economic dependence upon a single user entity. 47 Since the demand for
flexible work arrangements has driven a wedge between law and reality, the
jurisdictional boundaries of these statutes should be redrawn in order to
serve the "socioeconomic purposes"'' 48 of our most basic workplace laws.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2002).
144. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
145. See generally FAHLBECK, supra note 5.
146. See generally Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can t Tell an Employee When it Sees One
and How it Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 355-56 (2001).
147. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997)(en bane), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1098 (1998) (analyzing the employment status of contract-based "freelancers" who worked
side-by-side with regular Microsoft employees).
148. See Linder, supra note 120, at 187.
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Toward this objective, this section recommends expanding the coverage of
employment protection statutes, easing union organizing rules for leased
employees, and increasing the portability of certain employee benefits.
A. Expanding the Reach of Employment Protection Statutes
As discussed above,'49 the most serious legal problem resulting from
the increase in non-standard work arrangements is the lack of coverage for
many types of contingent workers under American employment protection
statutes. This problem, in turn, flows primarily from a restrictive
interpretation of "employee" status. The prevailing common law definition
fails to extend basic social protection to many workers who provide labor
under subordinate circumstances.' 50
This problem was high on the agenda of the Dunlop Commission, a
blue-ribbon panel of experts appointed by President Clinton in 1992. The
Dunlop Commission's proposed solution to this issue was to adopt a unitary
"economic realities" test for defining employee status.' 51  The
Commission's final report opined that the determination of whether
someone is an employee for purposes of employment protection statutes
Ashould not be based on the degree of immediate control the employer
exercises over the worker, but rather on the underlying economic realities of
the relationship."'' 5 2  Presumably, the Commission's recommendation, if
adopted, would extend the FLSA's economic realities test to other federal
labor, employment, and tax statutes.'53 Many commentators agree with this
recommendation. 54
While the Commission's recommendation would improve on the
current common law approach, it is not an ideal solution. The economic
realities test, like the common law standard, consists of a multi-factor
formula in which the right to control the manner of work is a significant
149. See supra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
151. See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 36. The
Report also recommended that the "'single employer' doctrine should be expanded so that firms do not
have incentives to use variations in the corporate form to avoid workplace responsibilities." Id. at 41. 1
have argued elsewhere in favor of the need for such reform and proposed a reformulated test for
determining employer status. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor Law and the Double-Breasted Employer: A
Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation, 1987 WIS. L.
REV. 67.
152. See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 38.
153. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text discussing the economic realities test as
currently used under the FLSA.
154. See e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 884; Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the
Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 749-50 (1995); Dowd, supra note 4, at 112-14;
Stone, supra note 24, at 652. But see Hylton, supra, note 3, at 849 (arguing for a cautious approach to
any increased legal regulation of contingent work).
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factor.'55 As demonstrated by Professor Marc Linder, the federal courts
increasingly have interpreted the economic realities test in a manner that is
more restrictive than its ostensible purpose would suggest.'56 As a result, a
considerable segment of workers is not covered, even though they are
economically dependent upon a particular user entity.'57
A comparative view may provide better solution. The rise in
contingent work is a global phenomenon. Many countries have recognized a
third category of workers that falls in between employees and independent
contractors. These "dependent contractors"' 58  technically are not
employees under the traditional legal tests, but nonetheless are recognized
as deserving of some employee-like legal protections by virtue of working
in positions of economic dependence.' 59 Employment protection laws in
Canada, 6° Sweden,' 6 ' Germany,'62 and the Netherlands,'63 for example, treat
dependent contractors like employees for some purposes, but not for others.
Most Canadian jurisdictions have adopted provisions that treat
"dependent contractors" as employees for purposes of collective
bargaining."6 Ontario's Labour Relations Act provides a useful definition
of a covered "dependent contractor":
... a person, whether or not employed under a contract of employment•...
who performs work or services for another person for compensation or
reward on such terms and conditions that the dependent contractor is in a
position of economic dependence upon, and under an obligation to perform
duties for, that person more closely resembling the relationship of an
employee than that of an independent contractor. 1
65
Germany's practice with regard to this category of workers is the one
most worthy of emulation. There, an intermediate group of "employee-like
155. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
156. See Linder, supra note 120, at 207-09.
157. See id.; Maltby & Yamada, supra note 4, at 260-62.
158. The term "dependent contractor" was coined by Canadian scholar Harry W. Arthurs. See
Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing Power,
16 TORONTO L. J. 89 (1965).
159. See Langille & Davidov, supra note 70, at 24-25.
160. See id. at25.
161. See Ronnie Eklund, A Look At Contract Labor in the Nordic Countries, 18 COMP. LAB. L. J.
229, 240-41 (1997) (reporting that "dependent contractors" are covered by Sweden's collective
bargaining statute (the Joint Regulation Act), but not by the Swedish Employment Protection Act).
162. See Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL. J. 77, 94-95
(1999) (reporting that "employee-like persons" in Germany are covered by statutes relating to workplace
health and safety, the prevention of sexual harassment, and collective bargaining, but not by statutes
relating to employment security and working time).
163. See van Peijpe, supra note 121, at 141, 152 (reporting that economically dependent workers
are covered by Dutch labor law, and to a lesser extent, by the Dutch statute regulating employment
security).
164. See Langille & Davidov, supra note 70, at 24-25.
165. Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O., ch. 1, Sched. A., 80 (2002).
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persons"'66 is technically self-employed yet nonetheless treated as
employees for some purposes because they are "economically dependent
and are in similar need of social protection."' 67  Thus, employee-like
persons are covered by statutes relating to workplace health and safety, the
prevention of sexual harassment, and collective bargaining.' 6 On the other
hand, these dependent contractors are not covered by Germany's Act on
Protection against Dismissals and the Act on Working Time. 69  This
dichotomy apparently reflects the notion that statutory coverage should be
broader where basic societal interests are at stake than where the interests in
question relate more narrowly to the status of an individual worker.
The United States should follow this example and extend the reach of
employee protection statutes that serve core societal goals to contractors
who are economically dependent on a user firm. Anti-discrimination
statutes such as Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 7 '
clearly fall within this category. The eradication of discrimination is a well-
recognized societal goal,'7 ' and it will not unduly distort labor market
competition by extending the anti-discrimination ban to this group of
workers.'72 The same is true for broadening the reach of the NLRA and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. 73 On the other hand, a different type
of solution is preferable in the context of with respect to ERISA and state
unemployment compensation laws, as discussed below.'74
B. Enhancing the Option of Collective Bargaining for Leased Employees
An expanded definition of a covered dependent worker under the
NLRA is insufficient by itself to facilitate the free choice objective of the
statute 175 when it comes to leased employees. In this context, the NLRB's
traditional approach to union organizing initiatives should be reformed to
provide jointly-employed workers a fair opportunity to exercise the option
166. See Daubler supra note 162, at 77 (describing "Arbeitnehmerahnliche Personem.").
167. Id. at 88.
168. Id. at 94.
169. Id. at 95.
170. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § § 621-634 (2002),
(prohibiting discrimination in hiring, discharge and mandatory retirement with regard to employees 40
years of age and older).
171. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
172. See generally HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW & PRACTICE 1039 (1992);
Maltby, supra note 4, at 265.
173. The Occupational Health and Safety (OSH) Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 651-78 (2002) (authorizing the
Secretary of Labor to adopt workplace health and safety standards and empowering him or her to
enforce these standards through workplace inspections and by issuing citations for noncompliance).
174. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the NLRA's objective of protecting the
right of employees to choose freely whether or not to be represented by a union).
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of union representation.
Leased workers from a temporary services company frequently work
alongside a user company's regular employees. Yet, while the regular
employees can decide for themselves whether to develop a collective
bargaining relationship with their employer, the leased workers, until
recently,"7 6 could not join that bargaining unit without the consent of both
joint employers-the supplier lessor company and the user lessee
company. 77 This is because the NLRB treated this situation as a variant of
multi-employer bargaining, where a union cannot expand a bargaining unit
to encompass another employer's employees without that employer's
consent. 78 Since such consent was rarely granted,'79 the leased employees
were usually left with the daunting task of organizing the supplier
company's dispersed workers.18 °
The problem with the multi-employer analogy is that, in many leased
employee contexts, the user firm is not an outside entity, but instead an
employer of both employee groups. The user entity and the supplier entity,
are considered joint employers of the leased workers if the two entities
share or co-determine matters governing the workers' terms and conditions
of employment. 81 The Board in MB. Sturgis, Inc.'82 recently declined to
accept the "faulty logic" of prior decisions that rely on rules applicable to
multi-employer bargaining.'83 The Board ruled that a unit composed of a
user employer's regular employees and those employees who are jointly
employed by a supplier employer and a user employer is permissible, so
long as the two groups share a sufficient community of interests.'84
Although combining regular employees with jointly employed
temporary employees may introduce some awkwardness in terms of tri-
party negotiations,'85 the Sturgis approach comes with several advantages.
First, eliminating the dual consent prerequisite to a combined unit offers the
176. See M. B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000) (overruling Lee Hospital in 2000).
177. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
178. See Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947, 948 (1990) (applying the rules generally applicable to
multi-employer units to the leased employee situation).
179. See Rahebi, supra note 138, at 1124 (referring to an interview with former Board Chairman
William Gould during which he reportedly "remarked that he had not heard of a case to date in which
the [leased] employees had obtained the consent of both employers.").
180. See id. at 1113-15; see also Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305 (reaffirming that the dispersed
employees of a supplier firm may seek to bargain with the supplier firm without needing to obtain the
consent of the various user firms).
181. See Riverdale Nursing Home, 317 N.L.R.B. 881, 882 (1995). As recommended above,
"dependent contractors" should be included within that group of workers determined to be jointly
employed for this purpose. See supra notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
182. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000).
183. See id. at 1305.
184. See id. at 1304-05.
185. See id at 1320-21 (Brame, member dissenting).
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only realistic prospect of meaningful choice in union representation for
leased employees. Second, combined-unit bargaining provides a vehicle for
narrowing the pay and benefits gap separating temporary and long-term
workers.'86 Further, the Sturgis decision will not unduly burden the user
firm's flexibility, since leased employees will be included in the unit only
where the user firm exercises control over the leased employee's working
life and assigns them to work tasks that are similar in nature to the user
firm's long-term workforce.'87 In this particular context, Sturgis limits an
employer's ability to use leased employees as a union- avoidance tool. 8'
At this point, a legitimate question could be raised concerning why a
Board decision that already has been issued should be included on a list of
proposals for reform. Either an appellate court or a newly constituted Bush
NLRB could reintroduce the dual consent requirement. While I would
oppose this retreat, the long-term elimination of the dual consent rule
should remain on the reform agenda.
C. Increasing the Portability of Benefits
Some commentators have called for more direct governmental
intervention to reduce the pay and benefits gap. For a number of years
beginning in 1987, Representative Patricia Schroeder introduced bills that
would require employers to provide proportional health and pension
benefits to certain part-time and temporary workers. 18 9 More recently, in
1999, Representative Lane Evans introduced legislation calling for
employers to provide contingent workers with equal pay for equal work and
the same benefits as regular employees after a qualifying period of work
attachment.'9"
These proposals are quite intrusive and likely not very feasible. Equal
pay for equal work is a concept that, as demonstrated by the federal Equal
Pay Act, applies to a very narrow range of positions. 191 It would likely
engender more litigation about what work is "equal" than it would engender
pay equity. As for benefits, it is difficult to conceive how Congress could
compel an employer to provide benefits to contingent workers when it does
186. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing the lesser pay and benefits generally
received by contingent workers).
187. SeeSturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1301, 1305-16.
188. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing that some employers hire contingent
workers in order to further a union avoidance strategy).
189. See, e.g., H.R. 2188, 103rd Cong. (1993); see also Schroeder, supra note 89, at 736-37
(summarizing the proposed Part-Time and Temporary Workers Protection Act).
190. See H.R. 2298, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Forster, supra note 140, at 570 (summarizing the
proposed Equity for Temporary Worker Act of 1999).
191. See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2002); see also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW 298 (West Group, 2d ed. 1999) (describing the Equal Pay Act's substantive
proscription as "brief and narrow").
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not do so for employees generally. 9 2  Further, a mandate for more
employer-provided benefits could act as a serious drag on employment.'93
A more fruitful route would be to increase the portability of benefits.19 4
As discussed above, many contingent workers are ineligible for certain
employee benefits because they lack a sufficient work attachment with a
particular employer. 95 Thus, an employee who has engaged in substantially
continuous employment with a series of different employers may not gain
eligibility for a variety of benefits. As an example of legislation that could
enhance portability, Congress could amend ERISA to provide that
employees who work for more than one employer can accumulate periods
of service to meet the minimum vesting period for a defined contribution
pension plan.' 96 Similarly, state unemployment compensation laws could
be altered to permit more employees who work at part-time and temporary
positions to qualify for some proportion of unemployment benefits.' 9 In
both situations, the cost of providing these benefits could be prorated
among the various employing entities.
Contingent work arrangements are not likely to decrease in the
foreseeable future, and trying to prevent them is futile. By increasing the
portability of benefits, the law can accommodate, rather than obstruct, the
prevalence of these non-standard work arrangements.
VII.
CONCLUSION
Professor Sanford Jacoby recently published an article in which he
disputes the purported demise of internal labor markets and long-term
192. ERISA, the principal federal statute governing employee benefits, regulates the fiduciary
management of benefits plans, but does not require that employers actually provide any particular
benefits to employees. See generally, Philip D. Hixon, Contingent Workers and ERISA: Should the Law
Protect Workers With No Reasonable Pension Expectations?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 667, 679
(2000).
193. MISHEL, ET AL., ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2000-2001
116-17 (2001) (noting that employer-paid benefits have increased three-fold since 1948 and now
constitute 15.6 percent of compensation). Since the amount of benefits generally is fixed for a full-time
employee without regard to the number of hours worked, an employer has a financial incentive to meet
labor needs by increasing hours rather than by increasing the number of employees. Id. (mandating
proportionate benefits for contingent workers likely would serve to strengthen that incentive).
194. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, which protects worker
access to health insurance when changing jobs, is an example of a federal statute that enhances the
portability of benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § § 1181-82 (2002).
195. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
196. ERISA currently permits employers to establish a minimum five-year employment period
before an employee's pension benefit fully vests. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
197. Most state laws require an employee to work twenty weeks per year in order to qualify for
unemployment compensation benefits. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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employment relationships. 98 The article reviews job tenure rates for the
past few decades and concludes that, while job tenure decreased during the
1980s and 1990s, "the majority of workers continue to hold career-type jobs
that offer fringe benefits, training, and prospects of continuity."' 9
Professor Jacoby undoubtedly is correct on this score. Contingent
work arrangements have not replaced long-term employment as the
predominant model of structuring work relationships. Instead, the
American labor market now is characterized by a majority of traditional
long-term jobs and a significant minority of less durable contingent jobs. In
effect, we now have a two-tiered labor market.
As this article has discussed, a considerable degree of inequality
pervades this two-tiered system. Employees in long-term relationships
generally enjoy better pay and benefits, greater job security, and the
protections afforded by social legislation. In contrast, workers in the
contingent sector generally earn less pay and benefits, have reduced job
security, and fall outside the zone of protective social legislation.
Americans tend to oppose practices that result in second-class
citizenship. The rise of contingent work has contributed to the creation of a
significant group of second-class workers. Not surprisingly, many would
like to see contingent work arrangements abolished or severely restricted.
A historical and comparative perspective suggests the propriety of a
more limited response. The historical forces leading to the great increase in
contingent work are too strong to be reversed outright. Similarly, a policy
of mandating benefits for this diverse group of workers is both unpractical
and unwise.
The more appropriate target for reform is the current black hole of
deregulation that excludes many dependent workers from coverage under
protective social laws such as Title VII, NLRA, and ERISA. These and
other statutes should be amended to extend coverage to contingent workers
who more closely resemble traditional employees than traditional
entrepreneurs. A comparative analysis, such as Germany's treatment of
"employee-like persons," provides valuable insights and examples for
structuring such reforms. In the end, labor and employment law and the
reality of contingent work arrangements should converge to extend
fundamental social protection to dependent workers.
198. See Jacoby, supra note 94, at 1205 (concluding that claims of the demise of long-term
employment relationships are "hyperbole").
199. Id. at 1220.
